| The Criminal Network Perspective / 1： |
| The Criminal Network Difference / I： |
| Flexible Order / II： |
| Centrality and Key Player Designations / III： |
| Direct Centrality and Visibility |
| Brokers as Key Players |
| Seek, Rather than Assume, Structure / IV： |
| Organization of the Book / V： |
| Case Study Sources and Designs / 2： |
| Case Selection and Access |
| Case Study Descriptions |
| Krebs' Terrorist Network |
| Project Ciel |
| Project Caviar |
| Projects Siren and Togo |
| Operation Springtime 2001 |
| Street Gangs and Drug Distribution in Montreal North |
| Designing the Criminal Networks |
| The Matrix and the Sociogram |
| Assembling the Final Network Representation |
| Centrality and Analogous Network Measures |
| In the Thick of Things |
| In Between |
| In the Thick of the Thick |
| Less Efficiently In Between |
| Localized Clustering |
| Challenges in Criminal Network Analysis |
| Clarity and Attributes in Relational Data |
| Missing Data Beyond the Final Network Representation |
| Missing Data Within the Final Network Representation |
| Are Central Participants Simply Central Targets of a Police Investigation? |
| Are Law-Enforcement Intercepted Networks Simply Failed Criminal Networks? |
| Partnership Configurations in Illegal Drug-Importation / 3： |
| Resource-Sharing in Crime |
| Two Networks in One |
| Direct and Indirect Connectivity Within the Ciel Network |
| Conclusion |
| The Efficiency-Security Trade-Off / 4： |
| The Network's Objective and Time-to-Task |
| Snakes and Clusters |
| Centrality Issues and Distinctions |
| Legitimate Strengths in Criminal Networks / 5： |
| Legitimate Actors in Criminal Settings |
| Differences Between Trafficker and Nontrafficker Subsets |
| Seeds in the Network |
| The Direction of Contact |
| Discrete Participants and Pawns |
| Law-Enforcement Disruption of a Drug-Importation Network / VI： |
| Coding for Criminal Network Dynamics |
| The Context of Control |
| The Uniqueness of the Caviar Case |
| Characteristics of the Overall Caviar Network |
| Changes in the Caviar Network Across Investigative Phases |
| Decentralization and Core Changes |
| Disorder and Accountability |
| Brokerage Qualifications in Ringing Scripts / 7： |
| Crime Scripts and Flexibility |
| Merging Crime Script and Social Network Frameworks |
| The Case Study Design |
| Determining Brokerage Qualifications |
| Assessing Participant Removal Impact on Script Permutation |
| Criminal Network Flexibility and Script Permutation |
| Overall Scripts |
| Networks Within the Scripts |
| General Participant Removal and Impact |
| The Broker Impact on Flexibility |
| Nonbroker Impact on Flexibility |
| Hells Angels in Springtime / 8： |
| Hells Angels Inc. |
| The Hells Angels Network in Operation Springtime |
| Variations in Key Participant Status Across the Network |
| Street Gang Presence in Drug-Distribution Operations / 9： |
| Gangs and Flexible Order |
| Past Research on "Gang Networks" |
| Three Investigations, One Network |
| Identifying Gang Members |
| Single-Case Versus Overlapped-Cases Representations |
| Where are the Gang Members? |
| Summary and Extensions / 10： |
| Extensions of the Criminal Network Perspective |
| Assessing Change Within Disrupted Networks |
| Content Analysis of Electronically Monitored Conversations |
| Expanding on the Social Embeddedness of Network Participants |
| Criminal Network Position and Individual Traits |
| Criminal Networks and the Criminal Career |
| Criminal Networks Beyond the Individual |
| The Master Network |
| Appendix |
| References |
| Index |
| The Criminal Network Perspective / 1： |
| The Criminal Network Difference / I： |
| Flexible Order / II： |
| Centrality and Key Player Designations / III： |
| Direct Centrality and Visibility |
| Brokers as Key Players |
