Game theory

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Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

資料種別:

図書

出版情報:

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1991

形態:

xxiii, 579 p. ; 26 cm

著者名:

ISBN:

9780262061414 [0262061414] (: hc)

書誌ID:

BA12956324

子書誌情報

フルテキスト

所蔵情報

他の版・巻

書誌詳細

注記:

Includes bibliographical references and index

主題:

Economics, Mathematical; Game theory

言語:

英語

目次情報:

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Static Games of Complete Information / I：

Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium / 1：

Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominance / 1.1：

Nash Equilibrium / 1.2：

Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria / 1.3：

Exercises

References

Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium / 2：

Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability / 2.1：

Correlated Equilibrium / 2.2：

Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria / 2.3：

Dynamic Games of Complete Information / II：

Extensive-Form Games / 3：

Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions / 3.1：

The Extensive Form / 3.3：

Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games / 3.4：

Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection / 3.5：

Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection / 3.6：

Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions / 4：

The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection / 4.1：

A First Look at Repeated Games / 4.3：

The Rubenstein-Stahl Bargaining Model / 4.4：

Simple Timing Games / 4.5：

Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubenstein Bargaining Game / 4.6：

Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria / 4.7：

Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria / 4.8：

Repeated Games / 5：

Repeated Games with Observable Actions / 5.1：

Finitely Repeated Games / 5.2：

Repeated Games with Varying Opponents / 5.3：

Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in Repeated Games / 5.4：

Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information / 5.5：

The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information / 5.6：

Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period / 5.7：

Static Games of Incomplete Information / III：

Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium / 6：

Incomplete Information / 6.1：

Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information / 6.2：

The Notions of Type and Strategy / 6.3：

Bayesian Equilibrium / 6.4：

Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibrium / 6.5：

Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies / 6.6：

Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria / 6.7：

The Distributional Approach / 6.8：

Bayesian Games and Mechanical Design / 7：

Examples of Mechanical Design / 7.1：

Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle / 7.2：

Mechanism Design with a Single Agent / 7.3：

Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiency / 7.4：

Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization / 7.5：

Further Topics in Mechanism Design / 7.6：

Appendix

Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information / IV：

Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling-Hand Perfection / 8：

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of Incomplete Information / 8.1：

Extensive-Form Refinements / 8.3：

Strategic-Form Refinements / 8.4：

Reputation Effects / 9：

Games with a Single Long-Run Player / 9.1：

Games with a Many Long-Run Players / 9.3：

A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long-Lived Opponents / 9.4：

Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information / 10：

Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model / 10.1：

Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or Repeated-Sale Model / 10.3：

Price Offers by and Informed Buyer / 10.4：

Advanced Topics / V：

More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance / 11：

Strategic Stability / 11.1：

Signaling Games / 11.2：

Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money" / 11.3：

Robust Predictions under Payoffs Uncertainty / 11.4：

Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games / 12：

Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria / 12.1：

Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs / 12.2：

Supermodular Games / 12.3：

Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium / 13：

Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games / 13.1：

Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition and Properties / 13.2：

Differential Games / 13.3：

Capital-Accumulation Games / 13.4：

Common Knowledge and Games / 14：

Knowledge and Common Knowledge / 14.1：

Common Knowledge and Equilibrium / 14.3：

Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure / 14.4：

Index

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Static Games of Complete Information / I：

Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium / 1：

Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominance / 1.1：

Nash Equilibrium / 1.2：

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