Preface |
Introduction / 1: |
Representations and Basic Assumptions / Part I: |
The Extensive Form / 2: |
Strategies and the Normal Form / 3: |
Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs / 4: |
General Assumptions and Methodology / 5: |
Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings / Part II: |
Dominance and Best Response / 6: |
Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance / 7: |
Location and Partnership / 8: |
Nash Equilibrium / 9: |
Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting / 10: |
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium / 11: |
Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies / 12: |
Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings / 13: |
Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings / Part III: |
Details of the Extensive Form / 14: |
Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection / 15: |
Topics in Industrial Organization / 16: |
Parlor Games / 17: |
Bargaining Problems / 18: |
Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games / 19: |
Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium / 20: |
Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, and Ownership / 21: |
Repeated Games and Reputation / 22: |
Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill / 23: |
Information / Part IV: |
Random Events and Incomplete Information / 24: |
Risk and Incentives in Contracting / 25: |
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability / 26: |
Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation / 27: |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium / 28: |
Job-Market Signaling and Reputation / 29: |
Appendices |
Review of Mathematics / A: |
The Mathematics of Rationalizability and Existence of Nash Equilibrium / B: |
Index |
Preface |
Introduction / 1: |
Representations and Basic Assumptions / Part I: |
The Extensive Form / 2: |
Strategies and the Normal Form / 3: |
Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs / 4: |