Game theory : an introduction

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Game theory : an introduction / Steven Tadelis

資料種別:: 図書
出版情報:: Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2013
形態:: xv, 396 p. ; 26 cm
著者名:: Tadelis, Steve <DA10308873>
ISBN:: 9780691129082 [0691129088] (: hbk)
書誌ID:: BB11178399

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注記:

Includes bibliographical references (p. 385-388) and index
Some printing have other pagination: xvii, 396 p.

主題:

Game theory

言語:

英語

目次情報:

Preface

Rational Decision Making / Part I：

The Single-Person Decision Problem / Chapter 1：

Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences / 1.1：

Preference Relations / 1.1.1：

Payoff Functions / 1.1.2：

The Rational Choice Paradigm / 1.2：

Summary / 1.3：

Exercises / 1.4：

Introducing Uncertainty and Time / Chapter 2：

Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes / 2.1：

Finite Outcomes and Simple Lotteries / 2.1.1：

Simple versus Compound Lotteries / 2.1.2：

Lotteries over Continuous Outcomes / 2.1.3：

Evaluating Random Outcomes / 2.2：

Expected Payoff: The Finite Case / 2.2.1：

Expected Payoff: The Continuous Case / 2.2.2：

Caveat: It's Not Just the Order Anymore / 2.2.3：

Risk Attitudes / 2.2.4：

The St. Petersburg Paradox / 2.2.5：

Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty / 2.3：

Rationality Revisited / 2.3.1：

Maximizing Expected Payoffs / 2.3.2：

Decisions over Time / 2.4：

Backward Induction / 2.4.1：

Discounting Future Payoffs / 2.4.2：

Applications / 2.5：

The Value of Information / 2.5.1：

Discounted Future Consumption / 2.5.2：

Theory versus Practice / 2.6：

Static Games of Complete Information / 2.7：

Preliminaries / Chapter 3：

Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies / 3.1：

Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma / 3.1.1：

Example: Cournot Duopoly / 3.1.2：

Example: Voting on a New Agenda / 3.1.3：

Matrix Representation: Two-Player Finite Game / 3.2：

Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors / 3.2.1：

Solution Concepts / 3.3：

Assumptions and Setup / 3.3.1：

Evaluating Solution Concepts / 3.3.2：

Evaluating Outcomes / 3.3.3：

Rationality and Common Knowledge / 3.4：

Dominance in Pure Strategies / 4.1：

Dominated Strategies / 4.1.1：

Dominant Strategy Equilibrium / 4.1.2：

Evaluating Dominant Strategy Equilibrium / 4.1.3：

Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies / 4.2：

Iterated Elimination and Common Knowledge of Rationality / 4.2.1：

Evaluating IESDS / 4.2.2：

Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability / 4.3：

The Best Response / 4.3.1：

Beliefs and Best-Response Correspondences / 4.3.2：

Rationalizability / 4.3.3：

The Cournot Duopoly Revisited / 4.3.4：

The "p-Beauty Contest" / 4.3.5：

Evaluating Rationalizability / 4.3.6：

Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium / 4.4：

Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies / 5.1：

Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Matrix / 5.1.1：

Evaluating the Nash Equilibria Solution / 5.1.2：

Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications / 5.2：

Two Kinds of Societies / 5.2.1：

The Tragedy of the Commons / 5.2.2：

Coumot Duopoly / 5.2.3：

Bertrand Duopoly / 5.2.4：

Political Ideology and Electoral Competition / 5.2.5：

Mixed Strategies / 5.3：

Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs / 6.1：

Finite Strategy Sets / 6.1.1：

Continuous Strategy Sets / 6.1.2：

Beliefs and Mixed Strategies / 6.1.3：

Expected Payoffs / 6.1.4：

Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium / 6.2：

Example: Matching Pennies / 6.2.1：

Multiple Equilibria: Pure and Mixed / 6.2.2：

IESDS and Rationalizability Revisited / 6.3：

Nash's Existence Theorem / 6.4：

Dynamic Games of Complete Information / 6.5：

The Extensive-Form Game / Chapter 7：

Game Trees / 7.1.1：

Imperfect versus Perfect Information / 7.1.2：

Strategies and Nash Equilibrium / 7.2：

Pure Strategies / 7.2.1：

Mixed versus Behavioral Strategies / 7.2.2：

Normal-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games / 7.2.3：

Nash Equilibrium and Paths of Play / 7.3：

Credibility and Sequential Rationality / 7.4：

Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction / 8.1：

Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Concept / 8.2：

Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Examples / 8.3：

The Centipede Game / 8.3.1：

Stackelberg Competition / 8.3.2：

Mutually Assured Destruction / 8.3.3：

Time-Inconsistent Preferences / 8.3.4：

Multistage Games / 8.4：

Payoffs / 9.1：

Strategies and Conditional Play / 9.3：

Subgame-Perfect Equilibria / 9.4：

The One-Stage Deviation Principle / 9.5：

Repeated Games / 9.6：

Finitely Repeated Games / 10.1：

Infinitely Repeated Games / 10.2：

Strategies / 10.2.1：

Application: Tacit Collusion / 10.3：

Sequential Interaction and Reputation / 10.5：

Cooperation as Reputation / 10.5.1：

Third-Party Institutions as Reputation Mechanisms / 10.5.2：

Reputation Transfers without Third Parties / 10.5.3：

The Folk Theorem: Almost Anything Goes / 10.6：

Strategic Bargaining / 10.7：

One Round of Bargaining: The Ultimatum Game / 11.1：

Finitely Many Rounds of Bargaining / 11.2：

The Infinite-Horizon Game / 11.3：

Application: Legislative Bargaining / 11.4：

Closed-Rule Bargaining / 11.4.1：

Open-Rule Bargaining / 11.4.2：

Static Games of Incomplete Information / 11.5：

Bayesian Games / Chapter 12：

Strategic Representation of Bayesian Games / 12.1：

Players, Actions, Information, and Preferences / 12.1.1：

Deriving Posteriors from a Common Prior: A Player's Beliefs / 12.1.2：

Strategies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium / 12.1.3：

Examples / 12.2：

Teenagers and the Game of Chicken / 12.2.1：

Study Groups / 12.2.2：

Inefficient Trade and Adverse Selection / 12.3：

Committee Voting / 12.4：

Mixed Strategies Revisited: Harsanyi's Interpretation / 12.5：

Auctions and Competitive Bidding / 12.6：

Independent Private Values / 13.1：

Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions / 13.1.1：

English Auctions / 13.1.2：

First-Price Sealed-Bid and Dutch Auctions / 13.1.3：

Revenue Equivalence / 13.1.4：

Common Values and the Winner's Curse / 13.2：

Mechanism Design / 13.3：

Setup: Mechanisms as Bayesian Games / 14.1：

The Players / 14.1.1：

The Mechanism Designer / 14.1.2：

The Mechanism Game / 14.1.3：

The Revelation Principle / 14.2：

Dominant Strategies and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms / 14.3：

Dominant Strategy Implementation / 14.3.1：

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms / 14.3.2：

Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information / 14.4：

Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information / Chapter 15：

The Problem with Subgame Perfection / 15.1：

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium / 15.2：

Sequential Equilibrium / 15.3：

Signaling Games / 15.4：

Education Signaling: The MBA Game / 16.1：

Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence / 16.2：

Separating Equilibria / 16.2.1：

Pooling Equilibria / 16.2.2：

Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games / 16.3：

Building a Reputation / 16.4：

Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma / 17.1：

Driving a Tough Bargain / 17.2：

A Reputation for Being "Nice" / 17.3：

Information Transmission and Cheap Talk / 17.4：

Information Transmission: A Finite Example / 18.1：

Information Transmission: The Continuous Case / 18.2：

Application: Information and Legislative Organization / 18.3：

Mathematical Appendix / 18.4：

Sets and Sequences / 19.1：

Basic Definitions / 19.1.1：

Basic Set Operations / 19.1.2：

Functions / 19.2：

Continuity / 19.2.1：

Calculus and Optimization / 19.3：

Differentiation and Optimization / 19.3.1：

Integration / 19.3.3：

Probability and Random Variables / 19.4：

Cumulative Distribution and Density Functions / 19.4.1：

Independence, Conditional Probability, and Bayes' Rule / 19.4.3：

Expected Values / 19.4.4：

References

Index

Preface

Rational Decision Making / Part I：

The Single-Person Decision Problem / Chapter 1：

Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences / 1.1：

Preference Relations / 1.1.1：

Payoff Functions / 1.1.2：

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