List of Figures |
List of Tables |
List of Games |
Preface |
Contents and Purpose |
Changes in the Second Edition, 1994 |
Changes in the Third Edition, 2001 |
Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006 |
Using the Book |
The Level of Mathematics |
Other Books |
Contact Information |
Acknowledgements |
Introduction |
History |
Game Theory's Method |
Exemplifying Theory |
This Book's Style |
Notes |
Game Theory / Part 1: |
The Rules of the Game / 1: |
Definitions / 1.1: |
Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma / 1.2: |
Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea / 1.3: |
Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordination / 1.4: |
Focal Points / 1.5: |
Problems |
Classroom Game: Fisheries (polished) |
Information / 2: |
The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game / 2.1: |
Information Sets / 2.2: |
Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information / 2.3: |
The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games / 2.4: |
An Example: The Png Settlement Game / 2.5: |
Classroom Game: Bayes' Rule at the Bar (in between) |
Mixed and Continuous Strategies / 3: |
Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game / 3.1: |
The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing / 3.2: |
Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game / 3.3: |
Randomizing Is Not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game / 3.4: |
Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game / 3.5: |
Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic Substitutes / 3.6: |
Existence of Equilibrium / 3.7: |
Classroom Game: The War of Attrition (polished) |
Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information / 4: |
Subgame Perfectness / 4.1: |
An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I / 4.2: |
Credible Threats, Sunks Costs, and the Open-set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits / 4.3: |
Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection / 4.4: |
Classroom Game: U.S. Air for Sale (polished) |
Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information / 5: |
Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox / 5.1: |
Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem / 5.2: |
Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner's Dilemma / 5.3: |
Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game / 5.4: |
Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching Costs / 5.5: |
Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game / 5.6: |
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (in between) |
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information / 6: |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III / 6.1: |
Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD Admissions Games / 6.2: |
The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V / 6.3: |
Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model / 6.4: |
The Axelrod Tournament / 6.5: |
Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model / 6.6: |
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Incomplete Information (improveable) |
Asymmetric Information / Part 2: |
Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions / 7: |
Categories of Asymmetric Information Models / 7.1: |
A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game / 7.2: |
The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints / 7.3: |
Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game / 7.4: |
Classroom Game: Moral Hazard Contracts Game (improveable) |
Further Topics in Moral Hazard / 8: |
Efficiency Wages / 8.1: |
Tournaments / 8.2: |
Institutions and Agency Problems / 8.3: |
Renegotiation: The Repossession Game / 8.4: |
State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II / 8.5: |
Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model / 8.6: |
The Multitask Agency Problem / 8.7: |
Classroom Game: Lobbying Teams (polished) |
Adverse Selection / 9: |
Introduction: Production Game VI / 9.1: |
Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II / 9.2: |
Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons Il and IV / 9.3: |
Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III / 9.4: |
Market Microstructure / 9.5: |
A Variety of Applications / 9.6: |
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII / 9.7: |
Classroom Game: Adverse Selection in Stock Sales (improveable) |
Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge / 10: |
Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principle / 10.1: |
Myerson Mechanism Design / 10.2: |
An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game / 10.3: |
The Groves Mechanism / 10.4: |
Price Discrimination / 10.5: |
Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement / 10.6: |
Classroom Game: Regulatory Ratcheting (improveable) |
Signaling / 11: |
The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling / 11.1: |
Variants on the Signalling Model of Education / 11.2: |
General Comments on Signalling in Education / 11.3: |
The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening / 11.4: |
Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues / 11.5: |
Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing / 11.6: |
Countersignalling / 11.7: |
Classroom Game: Signalling Marriageability (improveable) |
Applications / Part 3: |
Bargaining / 12: |
The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie / 12.1: |
The Nash Bargaining Solution / 12.2: |
Alternating Offers over Finite Time / 12.3: |
Alternating Offers over Infinite Time / 12.4: |
Incomplete Information / 12.5: |
Setting Up a Way to Bargain: the Myerson-Satterthwaite Model / 12.6: |
Classroom Game: Labor Bargaining (polished) |
Auctions / 13: |
Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete / 13.1: |
Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions / 13.2: |
Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty / 13.3: |
Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach / 13.4: |
Common-value Auctions and the Winner's Curse / 13.5: |
Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game / 13.6: |
Classroom Game: Auctions (polished) |
Pricing / 14: |
Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited / 14.1: |
Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox / 14.2: |
Location Models / 14.3: |
Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games / 14.4: |
Vertical Differentiation / 14.5: |
Durable Monopoly / 14.6: |
Classroom Game: The Kleit Oligopoly Game (polished) |
Mathematical Appendix |
Notation / A.1: |
The Greek Alphabet / A.2: |
Glossary / A.3: |
Formulas and Functions / A.4: |
Probability Distributions / A.5: |
Supermodularity / A.6: |
Fixed Point Theorems / A.7: |
Genericity / A.8: |
Discounting / A.9: |
Risk / A.10: |
References and Name Index |
Subject Index |