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1.

図書
図書
1. Evolution and game dynamics (: Berlin ; : New York)
Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; with contributions by I. Eshel ... [et al.]
出版情報: Berlin ; Tokyo : Springer-Verlag, c1991  viii, 328 p. ; 25 cm
シリーズ名: Game equilibrium models / Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; 1
所蔵情報: loading…
目次情報: 続きを見る
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach
Altruism in Social Dilemmas - Failure to Catch it in a Parameter
The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in a Medieval Literature
Balance of Power in a Parlor Game
Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach
The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance
A Game Theoretic Analysis
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures
Games With and Without Complete Information About the Antagonist's Intentions / Part I：
A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces / Part II：
Inspector Leadership With Incomplete Information
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
2.

図書
図書
2. Game equilibrium models
Reinhard Selten (ed.)
出版情報: Berlin ; New York : Springer, c1991  4 v. ; 25 cm
所蔵情報: loading…
3.

図書
図書
3. Methods, morals, and markets (: Berlin ; : New York)
Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; with contributions by D. Abreu ... [et al.]
出版情報: Berlin ; Tokyo : Springer-Verlag, c1991  viii, 367 p. ; 25 cm
シリーズ名: Game equilibrium models / Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; 2
所蔵情報: loading…
目次情報: 続きを見る
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach
Altruism in Social Dilemmas - Failure to Catch it in a Parameter
The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in a Medieval Literature
Balance of Power in a Parlor Game
Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach
The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance
A Game Theoretic Analysis
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures
Games With and Without Complete Information About the Antagonist's Intentions / Part I：
A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces / Part II：
Inspector Leadership With Incomplete Information
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
4.

図書
図書
4. Strategic bargaining (: Berlin ; : New York)
Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; with contributions by W. Albers ... [et al.]
出版情報: Berlin ; Tokyo : Springer-Verlag, c1991  viii, 282 p. ; 25 cm
シリーズ名: Game equilibrium models / Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; 3
所蔵情報: loading…
目次情報: 続きを見る
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach
Altruism in Social Dilemmas - Failure to Catch it in a Parameter
The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in a Medieval Literature
Balance of Power in a Parlor Game
Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach
The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance
A Game Theoretic Analysis
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures
Games With and Without Complete Information About the Antagonist's Intentions / Part I：
A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces / Part II：
Inspector Leadership With Incomplete Information
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
5.

図書
図書
5. Social and political interaction (: Berlin ; : New York)
Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; with contributions by R. Avenhaus ... [et al.]
出版情報: Berlin ; Tokyo : Springer-Verlag, c1991  ix, 361 p. ; 25 cm
シリーズ名: Game equilibrium models / Reinhard Selten (ed.) ; 4
所蔵情報: loading…
目次情報: 続きを見る
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
Resisting the Draft. A Perfect Equilibrium Approach
Altruism in Social Dilemmas - Failure to Catch it in a Parameter
The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in a Medieval Literature
Balance of Power in a Parlor Game
Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach
The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance
A Game Theoretic Analysis
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures
Games With and Without Complete Information About the Antagonist's Intentions / Part I：
A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces / Part II：
Inspector Leadership With Incomplete Information
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
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