Preface to the Dover Edition |
Preface |
Introductory Note |
List of Tables |
List of Figures |
International Relations Games / 1.: |
Introduction / 1.1.: |
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games with Saddlepoints / 1.2.: |
Information in Games / 1.3.: |
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games without Saddlepoints / 1.4.: |
Pure and Mixed Strategies / 1.5.: |
Interpretation of Mixed Strategies / 1.6.: |
Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games / 1.7.: |
Prisoner's Dilemma and the Theory of Metagames / 1.8.: |
Chicken and the Cuban Missile Crisis / 1.9.: |
Summary and Conclusion / 1.10.: |
Qualitative Voting Games / 2.: |
Voting Procedures / 2.1.: |
Sincere Voting / 2.3.: |
Straightforward Strategies and Voting Procedures / 2.4.: |
Equilibrium Choices and Vulnerability / 2.5.: |
Desirable Strategies and Equilibria / 2.6.: |
The Relationship between Desirable and Admissible Strategies / 2.7.: |
Sophisticated Voting / 2.8.: |
Coalitions and Information / 2.9.: |
Voting on Voting Procedures / 2.10.: |
The Paradox of Voting / 2.11.: |
Empirical Examples / 2.12.: |
Quantitative Voting Games / 2.13.: |
Requirements for a Voting System of Proportional Representation / 3.1.: |
Rules that Meet the Requirements / 3.3.: |
Interdependence of the Requirements / 3.4.: |
The Effects of Size / 3.5.: |
Information and the Choice of Strategies / 3.6.: |
Vote-Trading Games / 3.7.: |
What the General Possibility Theorem Precludes / 4.1.: |
Judgments about Vote Trading / 4.3.: |
Definitions and Assumptions / 4.4.: |
Sincere and Insincere Voting / 4.5.: |
Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading / 4.6.: |
Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading / 4.7.: |
The Consequences of Refusing to Trade / 4.8.: |
The Consequences of Forming Coalitions / 4.9.: |
Conditions Limiting Vote Trading / 4.10.: |
Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading / 4.11.: |
Voting Power / 4.12.: |
The Shapley-Shubik Index of Voting Power / 5.1.: |
The Banzhaf Index of Voting Power / 5.3.: |
Coalition Models of the Two Power Indices / 5.4.: |
Calculation of the Power Indices / 5.5.: |
Three Paradoxes of Voting Power / 5.6.: |
Empirical Applications of the Power Indices / 5.7.: |
Coalition Games / 5.8.: |
Power and Coalitions / 6.1.: |
Restrictions on Coalition Alignments / 6.3.: |
The Stability of Alignments / 6.4.: |
Empirical Conclusions of the Luce-Rogow Model / 6.5.: |
The Concept of Winning / 6.6.: |
The Size Principle / 6.7.: |
The Information Effect / 6.8.: |
Empirical Evidence for the Size Principle / 6.9.: |
Criticisms of the Size Principle / 6.10.: |
An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Share of Spoils / 6.11.: |
Election Games / 6.12.: |
The Need for Models to Assess the Consequences of Electoral Reform / 7.1.: |
Presidential Campaigns and Voting Behavior / 7.3.: |
The Goals of Candidates / 7.4.: |
The Popular-Vote Model / 7.5.: |
The Electoral-Vote Model / 7.6.: |
The 3/2's Allocation Rule / 7.7.: |
Why the Large States Are Favored / 7.8.: |
Testing the Models / 7.9.: |
Campaign Allocations and Biases through 1980 / 7.10.: |
Limitations and Extensions of the Models / 7.11.: |
Glossary / 7.12.: |
Annotated Bibliography |
Index |
Preface to the Dover Edition |
Preface |
Introductory Note |