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1.

図書
図書
1. Signaling games in political science (: hbk)
Jeffrey S. Banks
出版情報: London ; New York : Routledge, 2016, c1991  viii, 90 p. ; 21 cm
シリーズ名: Fundamentals of pure and applied economics ; v. 46 . Political science and economics section
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2.

図書
図書
2. Game theory : an introduction (: hbk)
Steven Tadelis
出版情報: Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2013  xv, 396 p. ; 26 cm
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目次情報: 続きを見る
Preface
Rational Decision Making / Part I：
The Single-Person Decision Problem / Chapter 1：
Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences / 1.1：
Preference Relations / 1.1.1：
Payoff Functions / 1.1.2：
The Rational Choice Paradigm / 1.2：
Summary / 1.3：
Exercises / 1.4：
Introducing Uncertainty and Time / Chapter 2：
Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes / 2.1：
Finite Outcomes and Simple Lotteries / 2.1.1：
Simple versus Compound Lotteries / 2.1.2：
Lotteries over Continuous Outcomes / 2.1.3：
Evaluating Random Outcomes / 2.2：
Expected Payoff: The Finite Case / 2.2.1：
Expected Payoff: The Continuous Case / 2.2.2：
Caveat: It's Not Just the Order Anymore / 2.2.3：
Risk Attitudes / 2.2.4：
The St. Petersburg Paradox / 2.2.5：
Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty / 2.3：
Rationality Revisited / 2.3.1：
Maximizing Expected Payoffs / 2.3.2：
Decisions over Time / 2.4：
Backward Induction / 2.4.1：
Discounting Future Payoffs / 2.4.2：
Applications / 2.5：
The Value of Information / 2.5.1：
Discounted Future Consumption / 2.5.2：
Theory versus Practice / 2.6：
Static Games of Complete Information / 2.7：
Preliminaries / Chapter 3：
Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies / 3.1：
Example: The Prisoner's Dilemma / 3.1.1：
Example: Cournot Duopoly / 3.1.2：
Example: Voting on a New Agenda / 3.1.3：
Matrix Representation: Two-Player Finite Game / 3.2：
Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors / 3.2.1：
Solution Concepts / 3.3：
Assumptions and Setup / 3.3.1：
Evaluating Solution Concepts / 3.3.2：
Evaluating Outcomes / 3.3.3：
Rationality and Common Knowledge / 3.4：
Dominance in Pure Strategies / 4.1：
Dominated Strategies / 4.1.1：
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium / 4.1.2：
Evaluating Dominant Strategy Equilibrium / 4.1.3：
Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies / 4.2：
Iterated Elimination and Common Knowledge of Rationality / 4.2.1：
Evaluating IESDS / 4.2.2：
Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability / 4.3：
The Best Response / 4.3.1：
Beliefs and Best-Response Correspondences / 4.3.2：
Rationalizability / 4.3.3：
The Cournot Duopoly Revisited / 4.3.4：
The "p-Beauty Contest" / 4.3.5：
Evaluating Rationalizability / 4.3.6：
Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium / 4.4：
Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies / 5.1：
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Matrix / 5.1.1：
Evaluating the Nash Equilibria Solution / 5.1.2：
Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications / 5.2：
Two Kinds of Societies / 5.2.1：
The Tragedy of the Commons / 5.2.2：
Coumot Duopoly / 5.2.3：
Bertrand Duopoly / 5.2.4：
Political Ideology and Electoral Competition / 5.2.5：
Mixed Strategies / 5.3：
Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs / 6.1：
Finite Strategy Sets / 6.1.1：
Continuous Strategy Sets / 6.1.2：
Beliefs and Mixed Strategies / 6.1.3：
Expected Payoffs / 6.1.4：
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium / 6.2：
Example: Matching Pennies / 6.2.1：
Multiple Equilibria: Pure and Mixed / 6.2.2：
IESDS and Rationalizability Revisited / 6.3：
Nash's Existence Theorem / 6.4：
Dynamic Games of Complete Information / 6.5：
The Extensive-Form Game / Chapter 7：
Game Trees / 7.1.1：
Imperfect versus Perfect Information / 7.1.2：
Strategies and Nash Equilibrium / 7.2：
Pure Strategies / 7.2.1：
Mixed versus Behavioral Strategies / 7.2.2：
Normal-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games / 7.2.3：
Nash Equilibrium and Paths of Play / 7.3：
Credibility and Sequential Rationality / 7.4：
Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction / 8.1：
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Concept / 8.2：
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Examples / 8.3：
The Centipede Game / 8.3.1：
Stackelberg Competition / 8.3.2：
Mutually Assured Destruction / 8.3.3：
Time-Inconsistent Preferences / 8.3.4：
Multistage Games / 8.4：
Payoffs / 9.1：
Strategies and Conditional Play / 9.3：
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria / 9.4：
The One-Stage Deviation Principle / 9.5：
Repeated Games / 9.6：
Finitely Repeated Games / 10.1：
Infinitely Repeated Games / 10.2：
Strategies / 10.2.1：
Application: Tacit Collusion / 10.3：
Sequential Interaction and Reputation / 10.5：
Cooperation as Reputation / 10.5.1：
Third-Party Institutions as Reputation Mechanisms / 10.5.2：
Reputation Transfers without Third Parties / 10.5.3：
The Folk Theorem: Almost Anything Goes / 10.6：
Strategic Bargaining / 10.7：
One Round of Bargaining: The Ultimatum Game / 11.1：
Finitely Many Rounds of Bargaining / 11.2：
The Infinite-Horizon Game / 11.3：
Application: Legislative Bargaining / 11.4：
Closed-Rule Bargaining / 11.4.1：
Open-Rule Bargaining / 11.4.2：
Static Games of Incomplete Information / 11.5：
Bayesian Games / Chapter 12：
Strategic Representation of Bayesian Games / 12.1：
Players, Actions, Information, and Preferences / 12.1.1：
Deriving Posteriors from a Common Prior: A Player's Beliefs / 12.1.2：
Strategies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium / 12.1.3：
Examples / 12.2：
Teenagers and the Game of Chicken / 12.2.1：
Study Groups / 12.2.2：
Inefficient Trade and Adverse Selection / 12.3：
Committee Voting / 12.4：
Mixed Strategies Revisited: Harsanyi's Interpretation / 12.5：
Auctions and Competitive Bidding / 12.6：
Independent Private Values / 13.1：
Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions / 13.1.1：
English Auctions / 13.1.2：
First-Price Sealed-Bid and Dutch Auctions / 13.1.3：
Revenue Equivalence / 13.1.4：
Common Values and the Winner's Curse / 13.2：
Mechanism Design / 13.3：
Setup: Mechanisms as Bayesian Games / 14.1：
The Players / 14.1.1：
The Mechanism Designer / 14.1.2：
The Mechanism Game / 14.1.3：
The Revelation Principle / 14.2：
Dominant Strategies and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms / 14.3：
Dominant Strategy Implementation / 14.3.1：
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms / 14.3.2：
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information / 14.4：
Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information / Chapter 15：
The Problem with Subgame Perfection / 15.1：
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium / 15.2：
Sequential Equilibrium / 15.3：
Signaling Games / 15.4：
Education Signaling: The MBA Game / 16.1：
Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence / 16.2：
Separating Equilibria / 16.2.1：
Pooling Equilibria / 16.2.2：
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games / 16.3：
Building a Reputation / 16.4：
Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma / 17.1：
Driving a Tough Bargain / 17.2：
A Reputation for Being "Nice" / 17.3：
Information Transmission and Cheap Talk / 17.4：
Information Transmission: A Finite Example / 18.1：
Information Transmission: The Continuous Case / 18.2：
Application: Information and Legislative Organization / 18.3：
Mathematical Appendix / 18.4：
Sets and Sequences / 19.1：
Basic Definitions / 19.1.1：
Basic Set Operations / 19.1.2：
Functions / 19.2：
Continuity / 19.2.1：
Calculus and Optimization / 19.3：
Differentiation and Optimization / 19.3.1：
Integration / 19.3.3：
Probability and Random Variables / 19.4：
Cumulative Distribution and Density Functions / 19.4.1：
Independence, Conditional Probability, and Bayes' Rule / 19.4.3：
Expected Values / 19.4.4：
References
Index
Preface
Rational Decision Making / Part I：
The Single-Person Decision Problem / Chapter 1：
3.

図書
図書
3. Understanding game theory : introduction to the analysis of many agent systems with competition and cooperation (: hbk)
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov [and] Oleg A. Malafeyev
出版情報: Singapore ; London : World Scientific, c2010  xiv, 286 p. ; 24 cm
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Preface
Basic ideas
Around the prisoner's dilemma / 1：
What is a two-player game? / 1.1：
Prisoner's dilemma. Dominated strategies and Pareto optimality / 1.2：
Prisoner's dilemma for crooks, warriors and opera lovers / 1.3：
Discrete duopoly models and common pool resources; public goods / 1.4：
Common knowledge, rationality and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies / 1.5：
Weak dominance; debtors and creditors / 1.6：
Nash equilibrium / 1.7：
Battle of the sexes and Kant's categorical imperative / 1.8：
Chicken game and the Cuban missile crisis / 1.9：
Social dilemmas / 1.10：
Guaranteed payoff, minimax strategy, hedge / 1.11：
Utility function / 1.12：
General objectives of game theory; Pascal's wager / 1.13：
Auctions and networks / 2：
Several players; the volunteers' dilemma / 2.1：
An example on iterated elimination of dominated strategies / 2.2：
Second price and increasing bid auctions / 2.3：
Escalating conflicts / 2.4：
Braess paradox / 2.5：
Wardrop equilibria and selfish routing / 2.6：
Wise men and businessmen / 3：
Wise men and their wives; imp in the bottle / 3.1：
King Solomon's wisdom / 3.2：
Chain store paradox; centipede game / 3.3：
Normal and extensive forms of a game; battle of the sexes revisited / 3.4：
Dynamic games and subgame perfection; pursuit games / 3.5：
Fair division and the ultimatum game / 3.6：
Cooperation by threat and punishment; infinitely repeated games / 3.7：
Computer tournaments; the triumph of the strategy Tit-for-Tat / 3.8：
Logical games; limits of the sequences / 3.9：
Russian Roulette; games with incomplete information / 3.10：
Hawk and doves, lions and lambs / 4：
Fitness and stability in population biology (general ideas) / 4.1：
Hawk and Dove games as social dilemmas / 4.2：
Mixed strategies, probability and chance / 4.3：
The theorems of Nash and von Neumann / 4.4：
Expectation and risk; St. Petersburg game / 4.5：
Symmetric mixed strategies Nash equilibria / 4.6：
Invasion of mutants and evolutionary stable strategies / 4.7：
The sex ratio game / 4.8：
Coalitions and distribution / 5：
Distribution of costs and gains; the core of the game / 5.1：
General principles of fair distribution / 5.2：
Utilitarianism and egalitarianism; compromise set / 5.3：
Equilibrium priced / 5.4：
Linear models and linear programming / 5.5：
Presidents and dictators / 6：
Collective choice; problems of voting / 6.1：
Four examples of voting rules / 6.2：
Criteria of quality of voting rules / 6.3：
The minority principle; dictators / 6.4：
At the doors of quantum games / 7：
Quantum bits and Schrödinger's cat / 7.1：
Lattices and quantum logic / 7.2：
Rendezvous of Bob and Alice / 7.3：
It's party time! / 8：
Combinatorial games / 8.1：
Addition and subtraction of games, order structure / 8.2：
Impartial games and Nim numbers / 8.3：
Games as numbers and numbers as games / 8.4：
Armed with mathematics
A rapid course in mathematical game theory / 9：
Three classical examples of Nash equilibria in economics / 9.1：
Mixed strategies for finite games / 9.2：
Evolutionary stable strategies / 9.3：
Replicator dynamics, Nash's fields and stability / 9.4：
Iterative method of solving matrix games / 9.5：
Zero-sum games and linear programming / 9.6：
Backward induction and dynamic programming / 9.7：
Cooperative games: Nucleus and the Shapley vector / 9.8：
Revision exercises / 9.9：
Solutions to revision exercises / 9.10：
Examples of game models / 10：
A static model of strategic investment / 10.1：
Variations Cournot's theme: Territorial price building / 10.2：
Models of inspection / 10.3：
A dynamic model of strategic investments / 10.4：
Game theoretic approach to the analysis of colored (or rainbow) options / 10.5：
Elements of more advanced analysis / 11：
Short overview / 11.1：
Two proofs of the Nash-Gliksberg theorem on the existence of equilibria / 11.2：
Introduction to structural stability / 11.3：
Introduction to abstract differential games / 11.4：
Cooperative games versus zero-sum games / 11.5：
Turnpikes for stochastic games / 11.6：
Games and tropical (or idempotent) mathematics / 11.7：
The first order partial differential equations in multi-criteria optimization problems / 11.8：
General flows of deterministic and stochastic replicator dynamics / 11.9：
Bibliography
Index
Preface
Basic ideas
Around the prisoner's dilemma / 1：
4.

図書
図書
4. Rational choice (: hardcover ; : [pbk.])
Itzhak Gilboa
出版情報: Cambridge, Mass. ; London : MIT Press, c2010  xviii, 158 p. ; 24 cm
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Complete Table of Contents
Preface
Suggested Reading
Optimization / I：
Feasibility and Desirability / 1：
Examples / 1.1：
Separating Can from Want / 1.2：
What Is Meant by Rational? / 1.3：
Uncertainty / 1.4：
Zen and the Absurd / 1.5：
On Theories and Paradigms / 1.6：
Utility Maximization / 2：
Example / 2.1：
Two Points / 2.2：
Interpretations / 2.3：
Measurement Issues / 2.4：
Utility and Disutility / 2.5：
Constrained Optimization / 3：
General Framework / 3.1：
Example: The Consumer Problem / 3.2：
Marginality Principle / 3.3：
Risk and Uncertainty / II：
Expected Utility / 4：
Expected Value Maximization / 4.1：
Expected Utility Maximization / 4.3：
Elicitation of Utility / 4.4：
From Simple to Complex / 4.5：
Probability and Statistics / 5：
What Is Probability? / 5.1：
Relative Frequencies as Objective Probabilities / 5.2：
Subjective Probabilities / 5.3：
Statistical Pitfalls / 5.4：
Group Choices / III：
Aggregation of Preferences / 6：
Summation of Utilities / 6.1：
Condorcet's Paradox / 6.2：
Impossibility Theorems / 6.3：
Pareto Optimality/Efficiency / 6.4：
Limitations of Pareto Optimality / 6.5：
Games and Equilibria / 7：
Prisoner's Dilemma / 7.1：
Nash Equilibria / 7.2：
Equilibrium Selection / 7.3：
The Power of Commitment / 7.4：
Common Knowledge / 7.5：
Extensive Form Games / 7.6：
Perfectness and Credible Threats / 7.7：
Free Markets / 8：
Example: The Case for Globalization / 8.1：
The First Welfare Theorem / 8.2：
Limitations of Free Markets / 8.3：
Rationality and Emotions / 8.4：
Evolutionary View of Emotions / 9：
Utility and Well-Being / 10：
Money Isn't Happiness / 10.1：
Qualifications / 10.2：
Epilogue
Notes
Index
Online Appendixes
Table of Contents and Downloadable PDFs
Complete Table of Contents
Preface
Suggested Reading
5.

図書
図書
5. Strategy : an introduction to game theory. 3rd ed (: pbk., international student ed ; : hbk)
Joel Watson
出版情報: New York : W.W. Norton, c2013  xv, 491 p. ; 23-24 cm
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6.

図書
図書
6. Formal models of domestic politics (: pbk ; : hardback)
Scott Gehlbach
出版情報: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013  xvi, 228 p. ; 23 cm
シリーズ名: Analytical methods for social research
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Electoral competition under certainty / 1：
Electoral competition under uncertainty / 2：
Special interest / 3：
Veto players / 4：
Delegation / 5：
Coalitions / 6：
Political agency / 7：
Regime change / 8：
Electoral competition under certainty / 1：
Electoral competition under uncertainty / 2：
Special interest / 3：
7.

図書
図書
7. Decision and game theory in management with intuitionistic fuzzy sets
Deng-Feng Li
出版情報: Heidelberg : Springer, c2014  xxi, 444 p. ; 25 cm
シリーズ名: Studies in fuzziness and soft computing ; 308
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8.

図書
図書
8. Games of strategy. 4th ed (: international student ed., [pbk.] ; : pbk)
Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, David Reiley
出版情報: New York : W.W. Norton, c2015  xxii, 732 p. ; 26 cm
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9.

図書
図書
9. Game theory : a nontechnical introduction to the analysis of strategy. 3rd ed
Roger A. McCain
出版情報: Singapore : World Scientific, c2014  viii, 590 p. ; 24 cm
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10.

図書
図書
10. Game theory : a multi-leveled approach. 2nd ed (: pbk)
Hans Peters
出版情報: Berlin : Springer, c2015  xvii, 494 p. ; 25 cm
シリーズ名: Springer texts in business and economics
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