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1.

図書

図書
Loren R. Graham
出版情報: Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, c1998  xiii, 177 p. ; 23 cm
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Preface
Is Science a Social Construction? / 1.:
Are Science and Technology Westernizing Influences? / 2.:
How Robust Is Science Under Stress? / 3.:
How Willing Are Scientists to Reform Their Own Institutions? / 4.:
Who Should Control Technology? / 5.:
Conclusion
Notes
Index
Other Books by the Author on Russian and Soviet Science
Preface
Is Science a Social Construction? / 1.:
Are Science and Technology Westernizing Influences? / 2.:
2.

図書

図書
Vernon L. Smith
出版情報: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008  xx, 364 p. ; 24 cm
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Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Rationality, Markets, and Institutions / Part I:
Rediscovering the Scottish Philosophers / 1:
Exchange in Social and Economic Order
Lessons from Scotland
On Two Forms of Rationality / 2:
Constructivist Rationality
Limitations and Distractions of Constructivist Rationality
Ecological Rationality
Implications
Impersonal Exchange: The Extended Order of the Market / Part II:
Relating the Two Concepts of a Rational Order / 3:
Airline Route Deregulation
The California Energy Crisis
Economic Systems Design
Constructivism as Rational Reconstruction of Emergent Order
Market Institutions and Performance / 4:
Knowledge, Institutions, and Markets
The Iowa Electronic Market
Strategy Proof-ness: Theory and Behavior
Did Gresham Have a Law?
Market Power and the Efficacy of Markets
Equilibrium with a Dominant Firm?
The Ethyl Case and Antitrust Policy
Gasoline Market Behavior and Competition Policy
Predatory Pricing
Entry Cost and Competition: Contestable Markets Theory
Asymmetric Information and Equilibrium without Process / 5:
Rationality in Asymmetric Information Markets
The Neoclassical Synthesis
Hayek and the Hurwicz Program
Experimental Markets with Asymmetric Information
Markets for Quality
Labor Markets and Efficiency Wages
FCC Spectrum Auctions and Combinatorial Designs: Theory and Experiment / 6:
Auctions: Modeling Institutions
Economics of English Auctions
Independent Private Values
Common Values
Review of Relevant Experimental Results
Single Object Auctions
Common Value Auctions
A "Winner's Curse" in Private Value English Auctions for Gambles?
Jump Bidding and the Class of Badly Performing Multiple-Unit English Auctions
The English Clock Corrects Bad Performance
Combinatorial Auctions
Tests of SMR and a Proposed Alternative
The FCC Auction Design Process
Auction Design for Complex Environments
The Combo Clock: Simple Solutions for Complex Auctions
Implications for the Design of Spectrum Auctions
Psychology and Markets / 7:
Psychology's Challenge to Constructivist Rationality
Psychology, Economics, and the Two Forms of Rationality
What Is Fairness?
Examples of Fairness
Fairness: An Experimental Market Test
What Is Rationality? / 8:
Economic Survival versus Maximizing Utility
Maximizing the Probability of Survival
Maximizing Expected "Profit," or Discounted Withdrawals
Is It Rational to Be "Rational"?
Literature Background
Modeling Net Subjective Value
Examples from Experiments
Monetary Incentives: Further Discussion
Rationality in Collectives and the Sense of Number
Market Rationality: Capital versus Commodity and Service Flow Markets
Personal Exchange: The External Order of Social Exchange / Part III:
Emergent Order without the Law / 9:
Rules and Order
Ellickson Out-Coases Coase
The Effects of Context on Behavior / 10:
Introduction and Elementary Theoretical Background
Perspectives on Interpreting Results
How Does Context Matter?
Anonymity as a Treatment Procedure
Perception, Context, and the Internal Order of the Mind
The Significance of Experimental Procedures
Overview of Experimental Procedures
The Ultimatum Game Example
Dictator Games
Behavioral Deviation from Prediction: Error, Confusion, or Evidence of Brain Function? / Appendix:
Investment Trust Games: Effects of Gains from Exchange in Dictator Giving / 11:
A Celebrated Two-Stage Dictator Game
Reciprocity or Other-Regarding Preferences?
Reciprocity in Trust Games / 12:
Trust Games without a Punishment Option
Why So Much Cooperation?
Is It the Subjects? Undergraduates versus Graduates
Machiavelli, Trust, and Cooperation: Mandeville's Knaves?
Is It Utility for Other Payoff?
Reciprocity versus Preferences: Does Own Opportunity Cost Influence Other Choice?
Extensive versus Normal (Strategic) Form Games
Trust Games with Punishment Options
Self-Regarding Cooperation in Repeat Play? Protocols with and without Direct Punishment
Effect of Matching Protocol on Frequency of Cooperation in Trust Games with and without Punishment
Comparison of Behavior in the Repeated Play of Extensive and Normal Form Games
A Matching Protocol Based on Sorting for Cooperative Behavior
Order and Rationality in Method and Mind / Part IV:
Rationality in Science / 13:
Rational Constructivism in Method
Can We Derive Theory Directly from Observation?
Economics: Is It an Experimental Science?
What Is the Scientists' qua Experimentalists' Image of What They Do?
Auxiliaries and the Ambiguity of Rejecting the "Test" Hypothesis
A D-Q Example from Physics
A Proposition and Some Economics Examples
The Methodology of Positive Economics
In View of Proposition 2, What Are Experimentalists and Theorists to Do?
Experimental Knowledge Drives Experimental Method
The Machine Builders
Technology and Science
Technology and Experimental Economics
In Conclusion
Neuroeconomics: The Internal Order of the Mind / 14:
Individual Decision Making
Rewards and the Brain
Strategic Interaction: Moves, Intentions, and Mind Reading
What Are the Neuroeconomic Questions?
A Summary / 15:
References
Index
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
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