Preface |
Acknowledgments |
Introduction |
Rationality, Markets, and Institutions / Part I: |
Rediscovering the Scottish Philosophers / 1: |
Exchange in Social and Economic Order |
Lessons from Scotland |
On Two Forms of Rationality / 2: |
Constructivist Rationality |
Limitations and Distractions of Constructivist Rationality |
Ecological Rationality |
Implications |
Impersonal Exchange: The Extended Order of the Market / Part II: |
Relating the Two Concepts of a Rational Order / 3: |
Airline Route Deregulation |
The California Energy Crisis |
Economic Systems Design |
Constructivism as Rational Reconstruction of Emergent Order |
Market Institutions and Performance / 4: |
Knowledge, Institutions, and Markets |
The Iowa Electronic Market |
Strategy Proof-ness: Theory and Behavior |
Did Gresham Have a Law? |
Market Power and the Efficacy of Markets |
Equilibrium with a Dominant Firm? |
The Ethyl Case and Antitrust Policy |
Gasoline Market Behavior and Competition Policy |
Predatory Pricing |
Entry Cost and Competition: Contestable Markets Theory |
Asymmetric Information and Equilibrium without Process / 5: |
Rationality in Asymmetric Information Markets |
The Neoclassical Synthesis |
Hayek and the Hurwicz Program |
Experimental Markets with Asymmetric Information |
Markets for Quality |
Labor Markets and Efficiency Wages |
FCC Spectrum Auctions and Combinatorial Designs: Theory and Experiment / 6: |
Auctions: Modeling Institutions |
Economics of English Auctions |
Independent Private Values |
Common Values |
Review of Relevant Experimental Results |
Single Object Auctions |
Common Value Auctions |
A "Winner's Curse" in Private Value English Auctions for Gambles? |
Jump Bidding and the Class of Badly Performing Multiple-Unit English Auctions |
The English Clock Corrects Bad Performance |
Combinatorial Auctions |
Tests of SMR and a Proposed Alternative |
The FCC Auction Design Process |
Auction Design for Complex Environments |
The Combo Clock: Simple Solutions for Complex Auctions |
Implications for the Design of Spectrum Auctions |
Psychology and Markets / 7: |
Psychology's Challenge to Constructivist Rationality |
Psychology, Economics, and the Two Forms of Rationality |
What Is Fairness? |
Examples of Fairness |
Fairness: An Experimental Market Test |
What Is Rationality? / 8: |
Economic Survival versus Maximizing Utility |
Maximizing the Probability of Survival |
Maximizing Expected "Profit," or Discounted Withdrawals |
Is It Rational to Be "Rational"? |
Literature Background |
Modeling Net Subjective Value |
Examples from Experiments |
Monetary Incentives: Further Discussion |
Rationality in Collectives and the Sense of Number |
Market Rationality: Capital versus Commodity and Service Flow Markets |
Personal Exchange: The External Order of Social Exchange / Part III: |
Emergent Order without the Law / 9: |
Rules and Order |
Ellickson Out-Coases Coase |
The Effects of Context on Behavior / 10: |
Introduction and Elementary Theoretical Background |
Perspectives on Interpreting Results |
How Does Context Matter? |
Anonymity as a Treatment Procedure |
Perception, Context, and the Internal Order of the Mind |
The Significance of Experimental Procedures |
Overview of Experimental Procedures |
The Ultimatum Game Example |
Dictator Games |
Behavioral Deviation from Prediction: Error, Confusion, or Evidence of Brain Function? / Appendix: |
Investment Trust Games: Effects of Gains from Exchange in Dictator Giving / 11: |
A Celebrated Two-Stage Dictator Game |
Reciprocity or Other-Regarding Preferences? |
Reciprocity in Trust Games / 12: |
Trust Games without a Punishment Option |
Why So Much Cooperation? |
Is It the Subjects? Undergraduates versus Graduates |
Machiavelli, Trust, and Cooperation: Mandeville's Knaves? |
Is It Utility for Other Payoff? |
Reciprocity versus Preferences: Does Own Opportunity Cost Influence Other Choice? |
Extensive versus Normal (Strategic) Form Games |
Trust Games with Punishment Options |
Self-Regarding Cooperation in Repeat Play? Protocols with and without Direct Punishment |
Effect of Matching Protocol on Frequency of Cooperation in Trust Games with and without Punishment |
Comparison of Behavior in the Repeated Play of Extensive and Normal Form Games |
A Matching Protocol Based on Sorting for Cooperative Behavior |
Order and Rationality in Method and Mind / Part IV: |
Rationality in Science / 13: |
Rational Constructivism in Method |
Can We Derive Theory Directly from Observation? |
Economics: Is It an Experimental Science? |
What Is the Scientists' qua Experimentalists' Image of What They Do? |
Auxiliaries and the Ambiguity of Rejecting the "Test" Hypothesis |
A D-Q Example from Physics |
A Proposition and Some Economics Examples |
The Methodology of Positive Economics |
In View of Proposition 2, What Are Experimentalists and Theorists to Do? |
Experimental Knowledge Drives Experimental Method |
The Machine Builders |
Technology and Science |
Technology and Experimental Economics |
In Conclusion |
Neuroeconomics: The Internal Order of the Mind / 14: |
Individual Decision Making |
Rewards and the Brain |
Strategic Interaction: Moves, Intentions, and Mind Reading |
What Are the Neuroeconomic Questions? |
A Summary / 15: |
References |
Index |